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Formation of the Public Limited Partnership
By Ronald R. Hrusoff* and Carlos A. Cazares**
IN searching for tax-saving methods, taxpayers have utilized many
devices. One that has always generated a great deal of interest is the
limited partnership.' A limited partnership created under the Uniform
Limited Partnership Act' must file an information return, 3 but unlike
a corporation, it pays neither federal nor state income tax. 4  Instead,
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The authors wish to thank Jack Schoellerman, a third-year student at the Uni-
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1. Limited partnerships have existed in the United States since 1822, when New
York passed the first Limited Partnership Act. Law of April 17, 1822, Laws of
N.Y. 1822, ch. 244, at 259. Although limited partnerships were unknown to the
common law, they have been in continuous use on the continent since the early
Middle Ages. See generally Ames v. Downing, 1 Bradf. 351 (N.Y. 1850); Lobingier,
The Natural History of the Private Artificial Person: A Comparative Study in Cor-
porate Origins, 13 TUL. L. REv. 41, 56 (1938); Note, Partnership in Commendam-
Louisiana's Limited Partnership, 35 TUL. L. REv. 815 (1961); Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d
1360 (1951).
2. In 1916, the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted a
Limited Partnership Act. See generally Lewis, The Uniform Limited Partnership Act,
65 U. PA. L. RPv. 715 (1917). This act has been adopted by 43 states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia. 6 UNIIonm LAws ANNOTATED 559 (1969). It was adopted by
California in 1929. Cal. Stat. 1929, ch. 865, § 1, at 1912 (now CAL. CORP. CODE
§§ 15501-31).
In recent years the act, as adopted by the states, has become considerably less uni-
form. For example, California amended the act in several respects in 1959, 1963,
and 1967. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 15502, 15507-09, 15519-20, 15525-25.5. New York
has also modified the act in several respects, one of which is to allow partnership
derivative suits. N.Y. PARTNRsmp LAW § 115-a (McKinney Supp. 1969). The enact-
ment of independent legislation affecting limited partnerships further contributes to the
decreasing uniformity of the act. E.g., Real Estate Syndicate Act of 1969, CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE §§ 10251(a), 10260(e) (imposing additional requirements upon those
partnerships investing only in real estate and selling beneficial interests to fewer than
100 limited partners in offerings that are not registered under the Securities Act of
1933). See text accompanying note 153 infra.
3. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6031; CAL. CODE REV. & TAX. § 17932.
4. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 701; CAL. CODE REV. & TAX. § 17851. The
intricacies of partnership taxation are beyond the scope of this article; however, the
partners, both general and limited, are taxed directly upon the profits
in proportion to their interest in the partnership, or as otherwise pro-
vided for in the partnership agreement. 5 The liability of a limited
partner, but not of a general partner, is limited to the amount of his
investment.6
California was slow to recognize public limited partnerships. As
late as 1961, an appellate court 7 quoted with approval the following
language from an article written by William Dahlquist:
[I]n bona fide limited partnerships, there is the right of delectus
personarum, the right to determine membership. No partner is ad-
mitted without unanimous approval of every other partner ...
[M]emberships are never indiscriminately offered at random to
the public at large. 8
For many years California's Commissioner of Corporations ac-
tively discouraged the use of large limited partnerships, except for
private offerings to sophisticated investors. With the promulgation of
the regulations9 under the Corporate Securities Law of 1968,0 the
policy was reversed, making possible the creation of publicly held
limited partnerships.11 Any type of business may be conducted through
a limited partnership unless prohibited by statute.12  Nevertheless, with
reader's attention is directed to A. WILLIS, HANDBOOK OF PARTNERSHIP TAXATION
(1957); Doll, Partnership Taxation and State Partnership Laws: A Check List of
Problems, N.Y.U. 20TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 789 (1962); Pennell, Current Problems in
Partnerships, U. So. CAL. 1968 TAX. INST. 315; Willis, Old and New Frontiers in
Partnerships: A Review and Look Ahead, N.Y.U. 20TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 699
(1962).
5. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 §§ 702, 704; CAL. CODE REV. & TAX. 17852-53,
17855-58.
6. Compare CAL. CORP. CODE § 15015 (general partners liable on obligations
of partnership) with CAL. CORP. CODE § 15501 (limited partners not bound by
obligations of partnership).
7. Rivlin v. Levine, 195 Cal. App. 2d 13, 21, 15 Cal. Rptr. 587, 592 (1961).
8. Dahlquist, Regulation and Civil Liability Under the California Securities
Act, 33 CALIF. L. REV. 343, 363 (1945).
9. CAL. AD. CODE tit. 10, §§ 260.140.110-.115 (1968).
10. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25000-804.
11. See CAL. AD. CODE tit. 10, §§ 260.140.110-.115 (1968); Freshman, California
"Blue Sky" Regulations and Real Property Limited Partnerships, 42 Los ANGELES B.
BULL. 303 (1967). Until the last 2 or 3 years, some doubt existed as to whether the
sale of a limited partnership interest was the sale of a security. See, e.g., Pawgan v.
Silverstein, 265 F. Supp. 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Curtis v. Johnson, 92 Ill. App. 2d 141,
234 N.E.2d 566 (1968); Reiter v. Greenberg, 21 N.Y.2d 388, 288 N.Y.S.2d 57, 235
N.E.2d 118 (1968); Jahn, When is a Security a Security?, 40 Los ANGELES B. BULL. 75
(1964).
12. Stowe v. Merrilees, 6 Cal. App. 2d 217, 44 P.2d 368 (1935). In approxi-
mately half of the jurisdictions, some restrictions are imposed. 2 S. ROWLEY, ROWLEY
ON PARTNERSHIP § 53.3 (2d ed. 1960). California, for example, prohibits limited part-
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a few exceptions,13 large public limited partnerships have only been
used in oil and gas explorations, 14 feed lots,' 5 and real estate ven-
tures.' 6 The evolution of the public limited partnership has been
a stumbling process, and due in part to the 1969-1970 stock market
collapse, not an entirely painless one.
The legal problems connected with the formation of the public
limited partnership go beyond the fundamental statutory requisites for
lawful existence. Although problems such as the use of a limited part-
ner's name as part of the partnership name, 17 the amount of control
over the operation of the partnership to be given the limited partners,'
8
and formation by substantial compliance with the -California Limited
Partnership Act' 9 are important, they are not the primary points of
concern for one creating a public partnership. Increasingly more com-
plex problems are emerging as public limited partnerships become
larger and more sophisticated. The ordinary formation problems are
overshadowed by questions concerning taxation,20 partnership invest-
ment policies,2 ' fees paid to promoters and managers, 22 and the trans-
ferability of limited partnership interests.2 3  This article will focus pri-
marily on these questions.
I. Formation
A limited partnership must have at least one general and one
limited partner.24 It can be formed, according to California Corpora-
tions Code sections 15501 and 15502, by substantial compliance with
the requirements set out therein. 25  The requirements are satisfied when
nerships from engaging in banking or in the insurance business. CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 15503.
13. E.g., Prospectus for Six Flags Over Texas Fund, Ltd., at 3 (June 12, 1969) (a
$5,950,000 limited partnership for the operation of an amusement park).
14. E.g., Prospectus for Husky Exploration Ltd., at 5 (Apr. 7, 1970); Prospectus
for Texas Petroleum Fund, Inc., at 5 (Nov. 5, 1969).
15. E.g., Prospectus for Circle One Cattle Fund, at 4 (Nov. 20, 1969); Prospectus
for Western Feed Cattle Fund, Inc., at 5 (March 24, 1970).
16. E.g., Prospectus for Burnham Properties Ltd., at 9 (Nov. 12, 1969); Prospectus
for Jasmin Groves CO., at 3 (Nov. 20, 1968).
17. CAL. CoRP. CODE § 15505(1). See text accompanying notes 35-36 inIra.
18. Id. § 15502(1) (a) (XV), 15507. See text accompanying notes 60-61 infra.
19. Id. § 15502(2). See text accompanying notes 63-65 infra.
20. See text accompanying notes 70-151 infra.
21. See text accompanying notes 170-76 infra.
22. See text accompanying notes 177-93 infra.
23. See text accompanying notes 194-207 infra.
24. CAL. CORP. CODE § 15501.
25. Id. § 15502(2).
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two or more persons" sign, acknowledge, 27 and record28  a limited
partnership certificate in the county of the principal place of business,
and in each county in which title to real estate is held.2"
The California Limited Partnership Act requires that the certifi-
cate contain 15 separate items.30 Failure to substantially comply with
these requirements may cause a limited partner to lose his preferred
status as to creditors and to be deemed a general partner."' As there
is no prohibition against including non-required provisions,32 a fre-
quent practice is to entitle the limited partnership agreement "Articles
of Agreement and Certificate of Limited Partnership," and to record
the entire document. This procedure has two advantages. First, it
eliminates the expense of preparing and executing a second instrument.
Second, it eliminates the possibility of inadvertently omitting a required
provision from either the certificate or the agreement. Where the part-
nership is closely held, however, the parties may not desire the entire
agreement to become a public document; for this reason they may
wish to record only the certificate. In public partnerships, the offering
circular or prospectus will disclose all facets of the proposed venture,
including a summary of the agreement, if not the agreement itself.33
26. The term "person" includes partnerships, joint ventures, and corporations.
CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 18, 2454. In California, corporations are frequently general
partners. E.g., Prospectus for Burnham Properties Ltd., at 2 (Nov. 12, 1969). How-
ever, not all states permit corporate partners. See generally 2 S. ROWLEY, ROWLEY ON
PARTNERSHIP 554 (2d ed. 1960); Armstrong, Can Corporations Be Partners?, 20 Bus.
LAW. 899 (1965); Committee on Partnerships and Unincorporated Business Ass'ns of
the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the A.B.A., May a Corpora-
tion Be a Partner?, 17 Bus. LAW. 514 (1962); 55 MICH. L. REv. 588 (1957).
27. The requirements for a valid acknowledgment are set forth in CAL. CIV. CODE
§§ 1180-207. As a practical matter, acknowledgment has become synonymous with
notarization. New York does not require acknowledgment, but does require that
the certificate be published in a newspaper. N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 91(1)(b)
(McKinney 1948).
28. The certificate must be recorded within a reasonable time after execution.
See Solomont v. Polk Dev. Co., 245 Cal. App. 2d 488, 54 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1966) (10
months unreasonable); Stowe v. Merrilees, 6 Cal. App. 2d 217, 44 P.2d 368 (1935)
(49 days reasonable).
29. The code does not require a written partnership agreement; thus, it is theo-
retically possible to have an oral agreement with the certificate serving as a mem-
orandum of the agreement. Cf. Calada Materials Co. v. Collins, 184 Cal. App.
2d 250, 7 Cal. Rptr. 374 (1960).
30. CAL. CORP. CODE § 15502(1)(a).
31. See Refinite Sales Co. v. Fred R. Bright Co., 119 Cal. App. 2d 56, 64, 258
P.2d 1116, 1121 (1953). See text accompanying notes 63-65 infra.
32. See discussion in Feld, The "Control" Test for Limited Partnerships, 82
HARV. L. REV. 1471, 1482 (1969).
33. For excellent forms see Prospectus for Burnham Properties Ltd., at 1-14,
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Corporations Code section 15502(1) (a) sets forth, in paragraphs
I to XV, the statements required in the limited partnership certificate.
34
They are briefly summarized below.
Paragraph I of the Corporations Code section 15502(1) (a) re-
quires that the partnership name be specified. The name need not
contain any special identifying symbols such as "Ltd." or "Limited."
The partnership, however, is prohibited from using the surname of a
limited partner unless it is also the surname of a general partner, or
prior to the time the named individual became a limited partner, the
business had been carried on under a name in which his surname ap-
peared. 35 If a limited partner's name is improperly used in the partner-
ship name, the limited partner will be liable as a general partner to any-
one who extends credit to the partnership without actual knowledge
that the limited partner is not a general partner.3 6
Paragraph H requires a brief statement describing the character
of the business. Following the pattern of corporate articles, the busi-
ness is generally described as broadly as possible. Most real estate
partnership agreements specify the properties to be developed or oper-
ated and then, as a catch-all, state that the partnership is allowed to
invest in any other real estate.
Paragraph III requires that the principal place of business of the
partnership be specified and Paragraph IV requires disclosure of the
name, residence and status-general or limited--of each member of the
partnership.
Paragraph V requires the certificate to state the "term for which
the partnership is to exist." The term may be stated as a specified
number of years, as ending on a given date, or as indefinite. If the
partnership invests in real estate, the term may be no shorter than the
term of any mortgage obligation.
37
Annex A (Nov. 12, 1969); Prospectus for Jasmin Groves Co., at 1-14, Annex (Nov. 20,
1968); Offering Circular for Pauma Valley Properties, Ltd., at 29-48 (Aug. 11, 1970).
34. An additional array of rules has been imposed by California's Commis-
sioner of Corporations. CAL. AD. CODE tit. 10, §§ 260.140.110-.115 (1968). For
detailed discussions of the technical requirements, see 2 Z. CAVITCH, BusnEss ORGANq-
ZATIONS § 39.05 (1965); 2 S. ROWLEY, ROWLEY ON PARTNERSHIPS §§ 53.1-.2 (2d ed.
1960).
35. CAL. CORP. CODE § 15505(l).
36. Id. § 15505(2). The more frequent problem arises when either the general
partner or a limited partner represents to a creditor that one or more limited partners
will guarantee certain partnership obligations. E.g., Donroy Ltd. v. United States,
301 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1962); Hayward Tamkin & Co. v. Carpenteria Inv. Co., 265
Cal. App. 2d 617, 624-25, 71 Cal. Rptr. 462, 467 (1968).
37. CAL. AD. CODE tit. 10, § 260.140.112(d) (1968). See also CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 10290.
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Paragraph VI requires disclosure of the amount of cash or prop-
erty contributed by each limited partner.38 If property is contributed
in lieu of cash, the value of the property for partnership purposes will
be determined by the agreement and not by the actual value of the
property. The value set forth in the agreement, however, must be es-
tablished in good faith; the parties are prohibited from stating a value
which they know to be false.39 An interest in the partnership for
services rendered may be given to a general, but not to a limited part-
ner.40  In other words, cash or the beneficial interest in the property
must be conveyed, transferred or assigned unconditionally by the lim-
ited partner, or on his behalf, to the partnership.
4'
Paragraph VII requires the certificate to state the amount and
time of any additional contributions expected from each limited partner.
If unimproved or minimum income land is involved, there should be
a detailed provision for assessability of the partners in order to pay the
balance of the purchase price and other expenses such as taxes and
operating costs. 42  In most cases, the maximum assessment is dis-
closed; 43 however, partnership interests have been offered in which the
investor may be called upon to make additional capital contributions in
undetermined amounts. In one offering the limited partners could be
called upon for contributions whenever operating capital fell below
$10,000. 44 This type of provision is totally unworkable because the in-
vestor has no way of anticipating his future outlays. The preferred
method is to have a schedule specifying maximum contributions. 45
The regulations provide that in the event a limited partner fails to
pay his assessments, his interest may not be forfeited.46 It may, how-
ever, be reduced or subordinated to the partnership interests meeting
38. The contribution must be made prior to filing the certificate. Kistler v.
Gingles, 171 F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1949); cf. Henningsen v. Howard, 117 Cal. App. 2d
352, 255 P.2d 837 (1953) (limited partner can make capital contribution on behalf
of third party).
39. Walraven v. Ramsay, 335 Mich. 331, 55 N.W.2d 835 (1952).
40. CAL. CORP. CODE § 15504. See also Silvola v. Rowlett, 129 Colo. 522, 272
P.2d 287, 290 (1954).
41. See Comment, The Limited Partnership, 2 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 105, 111 (1954).
42. CAL. AD. CODE tit. 10, § 260.140.112(a) (1968).
43. E.g., Prospectus for Jasmin Groves Co., at 4 (Nov. 20, 1968) (additional
$5,000 per year, not exceeding $15,000 overall).
44. Offering Circular for 97-Woodruff Apartments Co., at 4 (July 16, 1969).
45. E.g., Offering Circular for Pauma Valley Properties, Ltd., at 32 (Aug. 11,
1970) (a schedule of maximum annual contributions varying from $1586 in 1972
to $350 in 1979).
46. CAL. AD. CODE tit. 10, § 260.140.112(b) (1968).
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the assessment. In addition, the regulations suggest that the defaulting
partner's interest, after appraisal, may be sold to the partnership or to
the remaining partners.
Paragraph VIII requires a statement as to the "time, if agreed
upon, when the contribution of each limited partner is to be returned."
Absent such a statement, a limited partner is entitled to the return of
his contribution after he has given "six months' notice in writing to
all other members . . . -17 If capital is withdrawn, the certificate
must be amended to reflect the change in the amount of contributed
capital.
48
Paragraph IX requires that the certificate state the "share of the
profits or the other compensation by way of income which each limited
partner shall receive by reason of his contribution." Where the pro-
moters receive promotional interests, detailed restrictions are imposed
by the regulations.49
Paragraph X requires a statement covering "[t]he right, if given,
of a limited partner, to substitute an assignee as a contributor in his
place, and the terms and conditions of the substitutions." Unless
the agreement provides to the contrary, the consent of all other partners
is necessary. 0 In small closely held ventures, it is not uncommon for
transferability to be limited by a provision granting the remaining lim-
ited partners or the general partner the right of first refusal.51 The
regulations specifically endorse such provisions. 52  The large public
partnership agreements often contain language requiring the consent of
the general partner in order to transfer a limited partnership interest.
53
The principal reason for such a restraint is to provide one of the criteria
necessary to insure that the partnership will not be deemed an "asso-
ciation" for income tax purposes; for if it were so characterized, it
would be taxed under rules applying to corporations.54 Consent will-
generally be given freely, unless the partnership has covenanted with
the California Commissioner of Corporations to consent only to trans-
47. CAL. CORP. CODE § 15516(2)(c).
48. Id. § 15516(1)(c).
49. See text accompanying notes 177-93 infra.
50. CAL. CORP. CODE § 15519(4).
51. For a typical provision, see Prospectus for Six Flags 0. er Texas Fu -A, Ltd.,'
at 20 (June 12, 1969).
52. CAL. AD. CODE tit. 10, § 260.140.112(c) (1968).
53. See, e.g., Prospectus for Burnham Properties Ltd., at 8 (Nov. 12, 1969);
Prospectus for Jasmin Groves Co., at 6 (Nov. 20, 1968).
54. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7701. See text accompanying notes 108-51 infra.
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fers to persons meeting certain financial tests. 5 To insure itself a pub-
lie market, one recent partnership offered freely assignable participa-
tions in a limited partnership interest held by a single limited partner. 6
A ratable portion of the limited partnership interest is transferable to
the holder of a participation at his election, subject to obtaining the
consent of the general partners.57
Paragraph XI requires that "[t]he right, if given, of the partners
to admit additional limited partners" be stated.
Paragraph XII requires disclosure of any agreement that grants
one or more limited partners "priority over other limited partners, as
to contributions or as to compensation by way of income." Absent
such a provision, each limited partnership unit will be equal to all
other units.
5 8
Paragraph XIII requires that the certificate disclose whether a
provision has been made for the automatic continuation of the business
upon the death, retirement or insanity of a general partner. Absent
such a provision, the partnership automatically terminates unless all
remaining partners, general and limited, consent to the continuation of
the partnership. 9
Paragraph XIV requires disclosure of "[t]he right, if given, of a
limited partner to demand and receive property other than cash in re-
turn for his contribution."
Paragraph XV requires the certificate to declare the right, if given,
of the limited partners to vote upon matters affecting the basic structure
of the partnership; such matters include the election or removal of gen-
eral partners, the termination of the partnership agreement, and the
sale of all, or substantially all, of the assets of the partnership.6 ° The
regulations specifically require that a majority of the limited partners
be given the power to remove the general partner.1
55. See text accompanying notes 202-03 infra.
56. Prospectus for Investment Properties Associates, at 33-34 (Dec. 4, 1969).
57. Id. at 34.
58. CAL. CORP. CODE § 15514. Occasionally the originating limited partner
receives a disproportionate share of capital gains or depreciation. See Lanier v.
Bowdoin, 282 N.Y. 32, 24 N.E.2d 732 (1939); Prospectus for Investment Properties
Associates, at 7, 32 (Dec. 4, 1969).
59. CAL. CORP. CODE § 15520. As a general rule, public limited partnerships
provide for continuation. E.g., Prospectus for Burnham Properties Ltd., Annex A, at
8 (Nov. 12, 1969).
60. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 15502(1)(a)(XV), 15507(b); cf. CAL. AD. CODE tit.
10, § 260.140.110(b) (1968).
61. CAL. AD. CODE tit. 10, § 260.140.110(a) (1968). In the event participation
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As noted above, 2 a limited partnership is also formed by sub-
stantial compliance, in good faith, with the various certificate require-
ments. 3  Considerable leeway is allowed.64  However, failure to file
a certificate or to file a copy of the certificate in a county where the
partnership does business constitutes a lack of substantial compliance.65
In the event the certificate contains a false statement, anyone suf-
fering a loss due to reliance upon such a statement may recover his
loss from any partner, limited or general. But to be held liable, a part-
ner must have known of the false statement at some time prior to the
date the statement was relied upon, and must have failed to cause the
certificate to be amended to reflect the true state of affairs.66
Each time an additional partner is admitted or a person is sub-
stituted as a limited partner, the certificate of limited partnership must
be amended.6 7  To do so each of the limited partners must sign the
amended certificate.68 In large partnerships this is an impossible bur-
den. For this reason, in 1967 the California Corporations Code was
amended to provide that if the partnership certificate permits and the
partnership has 25 or more limited partners, the amendment need only
be signed by the selling limited partner, the substituted limited partner,
interests are sold, a majority of the holders of participation interests should be given
the power to instruct the limited partner to remove the general partner. See text ac-
companying notes 56-57 supra & 202-03 infra.
The amount of allowable participation in the administration of the limited part-
nership by the limited partners is treated in Linder v. Vogue Inv., Inc., 239 Cal. App.
2d 338, 48 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1966); Sloan v. Clark, 18 N.Y.2d 570, 223 N.E.2d 893,
277 N.Y.S.2d 411 (1966); and Lichtyger v. Franchard Corp., 18 N.Y.2d 528, 223 N.E.
2d 869, 277 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1966). Although there has been some liberalization in the
past 20 years, limited partners will still be accorded the status of general partners if
they take part in discussions determining business policy to any substantial degree.
In those partnerships where the general partner is a financially irresponsible corpora-
tion controlled by certain limited partners, their limited liability might be lost. See
Feld, The "Control" Test for Limited Partnerships, 82 HARV. L. Rv. 1471 (1969);
Note, Activities Making a Limited Partner Liable as a General Partner, 56 MICH.
L. REv. 285 (1957).
62. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
63. CAL. CORP. CODE § 15502(2).
64. See Giles v. Vette, 263 U.S. 553 (1923).
65. Tiburon Nat'l Bank v. Wagner, 265 Cal. App. 2d 868, 71 Cal. Rptr. 832
(1968); Refinite Sales Co. v. Fred R. Bright Co., 119 Cal. App. 2d 56, 258 P.2d 1116
(1953). See also Arrow Petroleum Co. v. Ames, 128 Ind. App. 10, 142 N.E.2d 479
(1957); Mud Control Laboratories v. Covey, 2 Utah 2d 85, 269 P.2d 854 (1954).
66. CAL. CORP. CODE § 15506; Walraven v. Ramsay, 335 Mich. 331, 55 N.W.2d
853 (1952); Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d 1449 (1954).
67. CAL. CORP. CODE 9H 15524(2) (b)-(c).
68. Id. § 15525(1)(b).
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and the general partner.6 9 At this writing, some dispute exists as to
whether each limited partner must execute the original certificate. Cer-
tain title companies have taken the position that this is necessary or the
certificate will not be validly issued. The partnerships have found this
position objectionable; consequently, the title companies have recently
agreed to reconsider their position.
H. Tax Ramifications
The primary motivation for organizing a venture as a limited part-
nership is to obtain partnership treatment for federal income tax pur-
poses. Contemporary ventures making use of this organizational form
are predicated on attracting capital from investors who want the losses
as well as the gains to flow directly to them as individuals. Under the
current tax laws, one other vehicle-the real estate investment trust-
could be used by a large public venture to minimize the income tax lia-
bility of the investor while limiting his liability to the amount of his
investment. A brief comparison of the two organizational forms is
necessary to understand the reasons for the increasing popularity of the
public limited partnership.
A. Real Estate Investment Trust v. Limited Partnership:
A Comparison
A real estate investment trust7 ° offers an investor the opportunity
to invest in a managed portfolio of real estate equities or mortgages. 7
69. Id. § 15525.5.
70. Massachusetts Business Trusts have existed for quite a few years; however,
real estate investment trusts as we know them are a creature of statute which came
into existence in 1960 with the enactment of Internal Revenue Code sections 856
through 858. See generally Dawson, The Real Estate Investment Tax, 40 TEXAS L.
REV. 886 (1962); Roberts & Shapiro, Real Estate Investment Trusts, N.Y.U. 19TH
INST. ON FED. TAX. 1047 (1961); Roeder, Requirements for Qua'ficatio., of R al Fs-
tate Investment Trusts, N.Y.U. 20TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 631 (1962): Real Es'a'c III
vestment Trusts (BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS TAX MAN.OEM,-NT P,11fo io - 0'
Good recent material is somewhat sparse, but includes I es & Gr'en, ._IT'5- --
or Opportunity, Commercial & Financ'al Chronicle, July 9, 1970, § 1, at 15; Kelly,
Real Estate Investment Trusts After Seven Years, 23 Bus. LAw. 1001 (1968); Thomas,
Misplaced Trust?, Barron's, July 7, 1969, at 3.
California also has real estate investment trust proxisions. CAL. CORP. CODE
§§ 23000-03; CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 24413.
71. Real estate investment trusts, hstorically, have invested either in equities
or in mortgages. See Prospectus for B.F. Saul Real Estate Investment Trust, at 3
(Dec. 18, 1969); Prospectus for Continental Mortgage Investors, at 2 (Feb. 18, 1970).
The most recent trusts tend to invest in both equities and mortgages. Prospectus for
Connecticut General Mortgage and Realty Investment, at 2 (March 17, 1970). In
addition, trusts have been formed for specialty projects such as the purchase of the
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Provided it meets various statutory tests, the trust will receive a deduc-
tion equal to the earnings it distributes to the holders of shares of bene-
ficial interest (shareholders). 72  That portion of the distributed earn-
ings that arose as long-term capital gain will retain its desirable status
as long-term capital gain for purposes of taxing the recipient share-
holders;73 the remainder is to be reported as ordinary income on the
shareholders' returns.74
To qualify as a real estate investment trust under the California
regulations, the trust must have a minimum capital of at least
$10 0, 0 00. 75  According to the federal tax law and regulations,
beneficial ownership must be vested in not less than 100 persons,
7 6
and no more than 50 percent of the shares representing beneficial
interests may be held by five or fewer persons during the last half of
the trust's taxable year. 7 These shares must be held during at least
335 days of the trust's taxable year, or during a proportionate part of
any taxable year of less than 12 months duration .
7
At the close of each quarter of the trust's taxable year, at least 75
percent of the value of the trust's assets must be comprised of real estate,
cash or cash equivalents, and government securities.7 9 For purposes
of this requirement, the term real estate is defined to include mortgages
and interests in other real estate investment trusts.80 Of the remaining
25 percent, not.more than 5 percent of the assets may be invested in the
securities of any single entity, and the trust may not hold more than
10 percent of the voting stock of any corporation.8 At no time may
the trust hold property primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of its trade or business.
82
Boston Patriot Football Stadium, Preliminary Prospectus for Stadium Realty Trust, at
2 (May 26, 1970); or to finance construction of motor inns, Preliminary Prospectus
for Marriott Inn Participating Investors, at 2 (Dec. 12, 1969); Preliminary Prospectus
for Holiday Inns Investors, at 2 (July 22, 1970).
72. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 857(b)(2)(C); CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 24413.
73. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 857(b)(3)(B); Treas. Reg. § 1.857-4(b) (1962).
74. Treas. Reg. § 1.857-4(a) (1962).
75. CAL. AD. CODE tit. 10, § 260.140.93 (1969). The Midwest Securities Com-
missioners Ass'n, Statement of Policy on Real Estate Investment Trusts E (July 16,
1970), in 1 BLUE SKY L. R P. 1 4801 [hereinafter cited as Midwest Commissioners'
Policy], requires a minimum capitalization of $200,000 or 10 percent of the net
assets of the trust upon completion of the public offering, whichever is less.
76. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 856(a)(5).
77. Treas. Reg. § 1.856-1(d)(5) (1962).
78. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(b).
79. Id. § 856(c)(5)(A).
80. Id. § 856(c)(6)(B).
81. Id. § 856(c)(5)(B);Treas. Reg. § 1.856-2(d) (2) (1962).
82. Treas. Reg. § 1.856-1(d)(4) (1962).
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At least 75 percent of the gross income of the trust must be de-
rived from real estate in the form of rent, mortgage interest, capital
gain, distributions from and sales of interests in other real estate invest-
ment trusts, and refunds of real estate taxes.8 3 To complicate the mat-
ter, an additional 15 percent of income must be derived from these
same sources or from dividends, interest, or capital gain from the sale
of stock or securities. 84  Finally, if 30 percent or more of its gross
income comes from the sale of stock or securities held for less than
6 months or from the sale of real property held for less than 4 years,
it will not be considered a real estate investment trust for that taxable
year.85 Rents are defined in such a manner as to exclude all amounts
received where the trust furnishes or renders services to tenants, or
manages or operates the property directly rather than through an inde-
pendent contractor.86 Further, rents received from any entity of which
10 percent or more is owned by the trust are also excluded.87
After electing to be taxed as a real estate investment trust, the trust
will not be taxed on the portion of its taxable income that is distributed
(including capital gains) in those years in which it distributes at least
90 percent of its income.88 The undistributed portion will be taxed
to the trust at regular corporate rates 9.8  Distributions to individual
shareholders do not qualify as dividends entitled to the $100 dividend
exclusion,90 nor do they qualify as dividends entitled to the 85 percent
corporate dividends received deduction."
There are no provisions passing net operating losses through to
the shareholders; thus, depreciation in excess of income cannot be used
to offset other income of the shareholders. Except for capital gains
distributed in the year realized, distributed income loses its original dis-
tinctive character upon distribution. 92
Real estate investment trusts may be unlimited in the size of their
portfolios or the number of shareholders; they may be leveraged
83. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(c)(3).
84. See id. § 856(c)(2).
85. Id. § 856(c)(4).
86. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(d)(3); see Rubin, Limitations on the Man-
agement and Operation of Real Estate investment Trusts: Powers of the Trustee,
Permissible Service to Tenants, N.Y.U. 20r INST. ON FED. TAx. 671 (1962).
87. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 856(d)(2)(B).
88. Id. § 857(a)(1).
89. Id. § 857(b)(1).
90. Id. §§ 116(b)(3), 857(c).
91. Id. §§ 243(c)(3), 857(c).
92. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 857(b)(3)(B).
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through borrowings or the issuance of debt securities;93 and they may
be merchandised with attractive warrant provisions, or in conjunction
with convertible debentures. 4  After an uncertain beginning in 1961
and 1962,11 they have recently become extremely popular-more than
100 were on the market as of August 1, 1970.96
The limited partnership, in contrast to a real estate investment
trust, is not hampered by percentage and holding period limitations on
the type of income that must be earned.97 Unless prohibited by state
law, a limited partnership may engage in any legal business, and thereby
receive all of its income from rentals, dividends, or from the operation
of a business.98 No portion of the partnership earnings need be dis-
tributed; flexibility of management is thereby insured.99
A partnership is not taxed on the income generated by its busi-
ness activities. 100 Rather, the partners are taxed directly on partner-
ship income in proportion to their interests or as otherwise determined
by the partnership agreement. 01' Selecting the partnership organiza-
tional form not only avoids a tax at the operational level, but more
importantly, it allows business losses, including depreciation, to flow
through to the individual investor. 102 Partnership earnings taxed to
93. At one time the Association of Midwestern Security Commissioners would not
clear an issue with debt exceeding 300 percent of the net assets of the trust. The
Midwest Securities Commissioners Ass'n, Proposed Statement of Policy on Real Estate
Investment Trusts f D (Feb. 20, 1970). Under the new policy statement, however,
they only require that the aggregate borrowings be "reasonable" in relation to the net
assets of the trust and that the maximum amount of such borrowings in relation to net
assets be described in the prospectus. Midwest Commissioners' Policy f D, supra note
75.
94. See discussion in Augustine & Hrusoff, The Regulation of Options and War-
rants, 45 Los ANGELES B. BuLL. 148 (1970).
95. Grant & Scheifly, Tax and Business Planning for the Real Estate Investment
Trust, U. So. CAL. 1963 TAX. INSmTtE 197, 198.
96. Thomas, Renewed Interest-Mortgage Investment Trusts Have Attracted Big
Money, Barron's, Aug. 24, 1970, at 3. See also Paine Weber Index in REIT's-Enigma
or Opportunity, The Commercial & Financial Chronicle, July 9, 1970, § 1, at 15-16.
97. Compare text accompanying note 85 supra.
98. Compare text accompanying notes 83-84 supra.
99. Compare text accompanying note 88 supra.
100. Compare text accompanying note 89 supra.
101. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 701, 704(a).
102. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 702; Treas. Reg. § 1.702-2 (1956). In cer-
tain extremely limited situations, a Subchapter S corporation could also be an advan-
tageous organizational form for federal income tax purposes. To qualify under Sub-
chapter S, however, the corporation cannot have more than 10 shareholders and
cannot receive more than 20 percent of its income from rents; thus, its usefulness to
ventures involving public offerings is negligible. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1371-
78.
PUBLIC LIMITED PARTNERSHIPSNovember 19701
the partners in the years earned may subsequently be distributed to
those partners or to new partners without a second tax being in-
curred.' 0o
A real estate investment trust has three serious drawbacks not
shared by a limited partnership. First, since losses may not be passed
through to the shareholders,' 04 the benefit of excess depreciation is
lost. 10 5 Second, since 90 percent of its income and gain must be
distributed,'0 6 the shareholders' investments cannot be accumulated
and reinvested. Third, the ability of the trust to invest in assets other
than real estate is severely limited.'0
7
B. The Association Problem
As the limited partnership concept has matured, partnership agree-
ments have assumed characteristics commonly associated with the cor-
porate form of organization.' Freely tradeable partnership interests,
centralized management, and limited liability have become the hall-
marks of progressive limited partnerships.' 9 As the resemblance be-
tween limited partnerships and corporations grows stronger, however,
the tax ramifications of selecting a particular organizational form be-
come less predictable.
State law is not definitive in determining how an organization
will be treated for federal income tax purposes." 0 Thus, a limited
partnership that meets all the state requirements for partnership status
might still be subject to corporate taxation if it is deemed to be an
"association" rather than a partnership under the Internal Revenue
Code."' It will be treated as an association if it more nearly resembles
103. Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.857-4(a) (1962).
104. See text accompanying note 92 supra.
105. Compare text accompanying note 102 supra.
106. See text accompanying note 88 supra.
107. See text accompanying notes 79-87 supra.
108. Partnerships have always been treated as an aggregate of their partners;
however, there is some indication that limited partnerships are being treated as sep-
arate entities. Compare Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476 (1933), Klebanow
v. New York Produce Exch., 344 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1965), and Ruzicka v. Rager,
305 N.Y. 191, 111 N.E.2d 878 (1953), with Donroy, Ltd. v. United States, 301 F.2d
200 (9th Cir. 1962).
109. See, e.g., Prospectus for Investment Properties Associates, at 29-32 (Dec.
4, 1969); Prospectus for Burnham Properties Ltd., at 1-12 (Nov. 12, 1969).
110. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(c) (1965).
111. Compare INT. Rrv. CODE OF 1954, § 7701(a)(3) (including "associations"
among those organizations used to define the term "corporations"), with § 761
(defining meaning of the term "partnerships"). For a discussion of the "association"
problem. see Dristoll, The Limited Partnership and the Association Question, U. So.
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a corporation than an ordinary partnership. The characteristics of an
association were developed in the case law and are now set down with
particularity in the regulations."' Despite the specificity of the char-
acteristics annunciated in the regulations, the actual determination of
whether any given partnership is an association requires a careful case
by case approach-seeking substance rather than form.
(1) The Landmark Cases
Morrissey v. Commissioner, 13 decided in 1935, is the landmark
case in which the United States Supreme Court set forth principles
that have become the basis for the current "association test" or, per-
haps more accurately, the "association tests." Although the Morrissey
case involved a trust, the opinion established a number of criteria to be
used in determining whether or not an organization of any sort might
be taxable as an association.
In Morrissey, the trust was created as a vehicle for investing in
and subsequently managing real estate holdings. Eventually, 920 peo-
ple owned beneficial interests in the corpus of the trust. Interests
were represented by transferable certificates for shares, and the lia-
bility of each investor was limited to his initial investment. Technically,
the investor-beneficiaries had "no say" in managing the affairs of the
trust, but the trust agreement provided that trustees could convene a
meeting to make reports to the shareholders. At the meeting, share-
holders could vote on proposals and make recommendations, but only in
an "advisory" capacity. 114
The Treasury Department argued that the structure and activities
of the trust made it taxable as an association. The Supreme Court
upheld this position. The Court, in a substance-over-form approach,
enumerated the relevant characteristics of an association: (1) holding
title as an entity; (2) centralized management through representatives
of the members of the association; (3) continuity of life despite death
or sale or transfer; and (4) limitation of the individual investor's lia-
bility." 5 It emphasized that none of the individual characteristics
CAL. 1960 TAx. INST. 539; Driscoll, The Association Problem in Joint Ventures and
Limited Partnerships, N.Y.U. 17TH INST. ON FED. TAx. 1067, 1071 (1959); Ehrenkranz,
The Investment Limited Partnership (Other Than Real Estate): Problems and Potentials,
N.YU. 26Ta INT. ON FED. TAx. 147, 156 (1968).
112. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (1965).
113. 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
114. The Morrissey trust was very close to the modern real estate investment
trust. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 856-58.
115. 296 U.S. at 359.
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was of itself a test for association status; rather, the determination was
based on the totality of facts and circumstances. Overlapping of some
of the criteria used to distinguish between corporations, trusts, and
partnerships soon became apparent. Courts attempting to apply the
Morrissey tests were perplexed as to which of the criteria should make
up the total test for the respective organizational forms.
In Glensder Textile Company" 6 the Board of Tax Appeals ex-
amined the characteristics set forth in Morrissey as they related to an
organization set up to comply with the Uniform Limited Partnership
Act. The government, relying specifically on Morrissey, argued that
Glensder Textile Company, a limited partnership, should be taxed as an
association. Its contention was that the partnership possessed all the
characteristics enumerated in Morrissey. The Board followed an analyt-
ical approach that first looked to what the state law permitted and then
to the actual partnership agreement to determine if, on the facts, the
organization was an association.
The Board held that although in a limited partnership the general
partners have "centralized control," their situation is not automatically
analogous to that of a corporate director.1 7 Of greater concern to the
Board was whether the general partners were mere agents of the limited
partners. For assurance that the general partners were acting on their
own, for their own interests, and not as agents of the limited partners,
the Board looked for "substantial assets" risked by the general partners
themselves in the venture.
1 18
The decision also held that the continuity of existence, which
stemmed from a reservation in the certificate enabling the surviving
general partners to continue the business on the death, retirement, or
incapacity of a general partner, was not analogous to the chartered life
of a corporation." 9 Nor did the mere reservation of a power allowing
the limited partner to transfer his whole interest convince the Board
that free transferability existed. The Board acknowledged the reserva-
tion of the power, but noted, "It does not appear. . . that such transfers
were contemplated, for no mechanics were provided for the ready
transfer of interests through certificates representing shares in the part-
nership."12  Glensder, by applying selected criteria from Morrissey to
an organization formed under the Uniform Limited Partnership Act,
116. 46 B.T.A. 176 (1942).
117. Id. at 185.
118. Id. at 183.
119. Id. at 185-86.
120. Id. at 186.
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was setting forth principles which eventually emerged as the current
Treasury Regulations.
(2) The Regulations
The current Treasury Regulations attach the "association" label
to any kind of organization that, because its characteristics so closely
resemble a corporation, is considered by the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) to be a corporation for tax purposes. The regulations state:
There are a number of major characteristics ordinarily found in a
pure corporation which, taken together, distinguish it from other
organizations. These are: (i) Associates, (ii) an objective to
carry on business and divide the gains therefrom, (iii) continuity
of life, (iv) centralization of management, (v) liability for cor-




No single characteristic is determinative; classification as an association
will depend upon the facts in the individual case. IRS assertions that
the organization should be treated as an association are proper only if
the organization "more nearly resembles a corporation than a partner-
ship or trust.'
' 22
Some of the major characteristics of a corporation are common to
trusts and others are common to partnerships. Naturally, characteristics
common to both partnerships and corporations are not material in dis-
tinguishing between these entities. The determination of whether a
business organization is to be treated for tax purposes as a partnership
or as a corporation depends on such distinguishing characteristics as
whether there exists centralization of management, continuity of life,
free transferability of interests, and limited liability. 23  A partner-
ship must possess a majority of the above corporate characteristics be-
fore it will be classified an association.12  A detailed examination of
each characteristic is necessary for a full understanding of the problem
faced by the contemporary limited partnership.
(a) Continuity of life
The regulations provide that
[a]n organization has continuity of life if the death, insanity,
bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, or expulsion of any member
121. Treas. Regs. § 301.7701-2(a) (1960).
122. Id. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) (1960).
123. Id. § 301.7701-2(a)(2) (1960).
124. Id. § 301.7701-2(a)(3) (1960).
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will not cause a dissolution of the organization .... 126
The test for continuity of life focuses on the continuing "identity" of the
organization. The death, insanity, or personal bankruptcy of a share-
holder does not cause a corporation to dissolve; the corporation has a
separate identity from its shareholders. The removal, resignation, or
incapacity of a general partner, however, ends the partnership. 26
Local law may allow the partners to enter into an agreement to
continue the business after the removal or withdrawal of a general
partner. 1 ' Such an agreement, however, does not create the same kind
of immortality possessed by a corporation. The existence of the part-
nership entity is still in a real sense contingent. Under the Uniform
Limited Partnership Act, any general partner may withdraw and dis-
solve the partnership at any time, 28 and thereby change the identity of
the organization. In fact, the regulations provide that a limited part-
nership subject to a statute corresponding to the Uniform Limited
Partnership Act lacks continuity of life.'
29
A common provision in many limited partnerships is the right of
the limited partners to remove a general partner."' This provision
furnishes a useful method of protecting a limited partnership from the
possibility of acquiring the corporate characteristic of continuity of life.
(b) Centralized Management
Centralized management is defined as "a concentration of continu-
ing exclusive authority to make independent business decisions on be-
half of the organization which do not require ratification by members
of such organization."'' The term "management" means broad
power to enter into binding agreements in the name of the organization.
It is not intended to apply to "ministerial tasks" or to those acts of an
agent performed at the direction of his principal.
The type of power necessary to constitute centralized management
is that power held by a trustee or a board of directors. The regulations
state that "limited partnerships subject to a statute corresponding to the
Uniform Limited Partnership Act, generally do not have centralized
125. Id. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (1960).
126. CAL. CORP. CODE § 15031.
127. Id. § 15038(2)(b).
128. Id. §5 15031(1)(b), 15509(1).
129. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(3) (1960).
130. See, e.g., Prospectus for Burnham Properties, Ltd., at 9, Annex A (Nov. 12,
1969).
131. Treas Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(3) (1960).
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management, but centralized management ordinarily does exist in such
a limited partnership if substantially all the interests in the partnership
are owned by the limited partners."' 32 The more capital contributed
by the limited partners and the more widely held the partnership inter-
ests become, the closer the organization comes to having "centralized
management."
(c) Limited Liability
"An organization has the corporate characteristic of limited liabil-
ity if under local law there is no member who is personally liable for
the debts of or claims against the organization."'13  In the typical lim-
ited partnership conforming to the Uniform Limited Partnership Act,
personal liability exists with respect to each general partner. The reg-
ulations specifically require, however, that the general partners have
"substantial assets," over and above their investment, that can be
reached by a creditor of the organization.' If the general partner
is a corporation, it must have substantial assets beyond its interest in
the partnership. If these tests are not met, the IRS deems that the
liability of the limited partner is not limited.33 In many instances the
public limited partnership will be unable to meet this test.'3 6
(d) Free Transferability
"An organization has the corporate characteristic of free transfer-
ability of interests if each of its members or those members owning
substantially all of the interests in the organization have the power,
without the consent of other members, to substitute for themselves in
the same organization a person who is not a member of the organiza-
tion.' 3 7  To constitute free transferability in the corporate sense,
the individual must be able to transfer all attributes of his interest in
the organization. Thus, free transferability of interests is not present
if a limited partnership agreement allows a partner to transfer his right
to share in the partnership profits, but not his right to be a limited
partner.'3 8 Further, if either the limited partnership agreement or local
132. Id. § 301.7701-2(c)(4) (1960).
133. Id. § 301.7701-2(d)(1) (1960).
134. Id. § 301.7701-2(d)(2) (1960).
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., Prospectus for Burnham Properties Ltd., at 7 (Nov. 12, 1969).
137. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(1) (1960).
138. Investment Properties Associates, with freely transferable participation in-
terests, has attempted to resolve this problem by allowing a participation holder to
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law provides that the transfer of a partnership interest dissolves the old
partnership and that the remaining general partners have a right to ap-
prove or to disapprove the new partner, then free transferability in the
corporate sense does not exist.
(3) Internal Revenue Service Policy: A Change?
At this date it is fairly easy to structure a public limited partner-
ship in a manner that will pass muster. To some extent this is due
to a nonaggressive approach by the IRS in this area. There is, how-
ever, some indication that this policy is changing. Of importance, and
no doubt on the mind of some potential investors, is the recent change
of position by the IRS" 9 with regard to the line of professional corpo-
ration cases following United States v. Kintner.1 ' The IRS announce-
ment appears to have brought an end to a long and losing battle for
the government;. 4 ' however, it may provide a basis for the IRS to
attack the "partnership" tax status of public limited partnerships.
In Kintner a group of doctors operating as a professional associa-
tion (a partnership under the local law) argued that their organization
should be taxed as a corporation for federal income tax purposes.
The court carefully examined the articles of the organization and de-
termined that it possessed enough of the requisite corporate character-
istics to qualify for corporate tax treatment. In reaching its decision,
the court admonished the IRS for its inconsistent stand, stating:
The Government's contention here goes counter not only to the
policy of the Internal Revenue Department, which, at all times,
declines to be bound by State law, but also to the latest Treasury
regulation on the subject which reads: "The term 'association' is
not used in the Internal Revenue Code in any narrow or technical
sense. . . . It is immaterial whether such organization is created
by an agreement, a declaration of trust, a statute, or otherwise."'1 4 2
The IRS refused to accept the Kintner decision and continued to tax
become a limited partner on his demand. As a practical matter few, if any,
holders will desire to become partners as they would receive no additional benefit and
would then have a non-liquid security. Prospectus for Investment Properties Associates,
at 34 (Dec. 4, 1969).
139. T.I.R. 1019 (Aug. 8, 1969), in 7 CCH 1969 STAND. FED. TAX. REP. 6867.
140. 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
141. See Kurzner v. United States, 413 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1969), aff'g 286 F.
Supp. 839 (S.D. Fla. 1968); United States v. O'Neill, 410 F.2d 888 (6th Cir. 1969),
aff'g 281 F. Supp. 359 (N.D. Ohio 1968); Holder v. United States, 412 F.2d 1189
(5th Cir. 1969), af'g 289 F. Supp. 160 (N.D. Ga. 1968); United States v. Empey,
406 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1969), aff'g 272 F. Supp. 851 (D. Colo. 1967); Wallace v.
United States, 294 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D. Ark. 1968).
142. 216 F.2d at 423.
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professional associations as partnerships-in spite of the fact that many
states enacted legislation permitting physicians, lawyers, and other pro-
fessionals to incorporate. Finally, after losing case after case in circuit
after circuit, the IRS conceded defeat in August 1969.143
During the battle it was incumbent upon the IRS to maintain a
consistent position with respect to what the government deemed to be
an association. It would have been intolerable to argue that "asso-
ciation" should be construed narrowly when the taxpayer was seeking
certain tax advantages of a professional corporation and liberally when
the IRS was seeking to impose the corporate tax on the earnings of the
limited partnership. In order to assert that professional corporations
should be denied corporate status for tax purposes, the IRS, to be con-
sistent, had to refrain from taxing limited partnerships as corporations.
Thus, the IRS concession of defeat makes the position of public
limited partnerships somewhat problematical. Despite the fact that an
organization qualifies under local law as a limited partnership, the gov-
ernment can now use the Kintner rationale-to argue that the need for
uniformity in the federal tax system requires that these vehicles be taxed
as associations. The Kintner "battle" left in its wake numerous pages
of dictum that are explicit in their advocacy of a loose and nontechnical
construction of the term "association."'1 44  A serious loss of revenue
because of a significant increase in limited partnerships might well lead
the government into a campaign against limited partnerships similar to
the one undertaken against the professional corporation.
It is not necessary for a limited partnership to obtain permission
from the IRS to be classified as a partnership for tax purposes. In light
of the aforementioned developments, however, it is advisable. Public
limited partnerships are designed -to amass large amounts of capital,
and as their need for capital increases, the base of potential investors
necessarily broadens. Informing a potential investor of a favorable
IRS ruling to the effect that the limited partnership will not be taxed
143. T.I.R. 1019 (Aug. 8, 1969), supra note 140. For a more complete dis-
cussion of the "battle" and for general background the reader's attention is directed to
ATTORNEY'S GUDE TO CALIFORNIA PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS (Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar
1969); Eaton, Two New Professional Corporation Cases: Taxpayers Win Four
Straight, 29 J. oF TAx. 202 (1968); Mullane & Williams, Professional Organizations-
General Coverage (BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS TAX MANAGEMENT Portfolio No. 227,'
1970); Pennell, 1965 Kintner Regulations Held Invalid as Unreasonable and Inconsistent
with Revenue Statutes, 57 ILL. B.J. 762 (1969).
144. In Kintner the court quotes the regulations to the effect that "the term 'as-
sociation' is not to be used in the Internal Revenue Code in any narrow or techni-
cal sense." 216 F.2d at 423.
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as an association is undoubtedly a strong selling point. Such a ruling
affords the limited partnership an extremely desirable type of protec-
tion. For this reason both Burnham Properties" 5 and Investment
Properties Associates obtained revenue rulings. 4 ' While it is techni-
cally possible for the IRS to retroactively revoke a private ruling, 4 - in
practice it is rarely done.
To obtain a ruling the applicant must set forth explicitly the facts
of the proposed venture. A ruling will not be given for a hypothetical
venture.'48  In addition to all the relevant facts, the applicant, according
to IRS policy, must make certain representations concerning the owner-
ship structure of the proposed venture.4 9 If the general partner is a
corporation, the IRS also demands the applicant's assurance that the
limited partner will not own "directly or indirectly, individually or in
the aggregate, more than 20% of the stock of the corporate general
partner or any of its affiliates, as defined in § 1504(a) of the Code."' °
It will further require that the general partner's net worth available
for creditors at least equals the greater of $250,000 or 10 percent of
the total amount raised by the offering.1
5 '
1H. The Limited Partnership as a Security
Before limited partnership interests may be marketed, they must
be registered under one or more federal and state provisions.'52 If
interests in a partnership organized to deal in real estate are sold to no
145. Prospectus for Burnham Properties Ltd., at 6 (Nov. 12, 1969).
146. Prospectus for Investment Properties Associates, at 38 (Dec. 4, 1969).
147. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7805(b); E. GOODRICH, L. REDMAN, & J. QUIGGLE,
PROCEDURE BEFORE THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 181 n.27 (1965).
148. GOODRICH, REDMAN & QUIGGLE, supra note 147, at 175.
149. Points to Remember-5. Service Ruling Guidelines Regarding Classification
of Certain Limited Partnerships, 23 TAX LAW. 666 (1970); Points to Remember-13.
Corporation as Sole General Partner of Limited Partnership, 23 TAX LAw. 202 (1969).
150. Corporation as Sole General Partner of Limited Partnership, supra note
149.
151. Zarrow, Tax Shelters and the Public-New Uses for Limited Partnerships
and Joint Ventures, U. So. CAL. 1970 TAx INsT. 277, 285.
152. If offered to no more than 25 persons and sold to no more than 10, limited
partnership interests are exempt from qualification under the California Corporate
Securities Law. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(f); CAL. AD. CODE tit. 10, § 260.102.2
(1969). They are probably also exempted from registration by section 4(1) of the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1964), so long as the purchaser is a
sophisticated investor and has been provided with sufficient information to allow him
to make an intelligent determination of the value of the security he is offered. See
Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953); United States
v. Hill, 298 F. Supp. 1221 (D. Conn. 1969).
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more than 100 California residents, and a registration statement has not
been filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) under
the Securities Act of 1933, the issue may be qualified with the Real Es-
tate Commissioner. 5" Those issues sold to more than 100 California
residents must be qualified with the Corporations Commissioner,'" but
not with the SEC so long as all requirements of the intrastate exemption
are met.155 If it is offered in two or more states, a registration statement
must be filed with the SEC under the Securities Act of 1933,156 and
qualified by coordination with the Corporations Commissioner. 157
All of the larger public limited partnerships are qualified either
with the Corporations Commissioner under the intrastate exemption or
are registered with the SEC. Although the structure of the partner-
ship will to a great extent govern the type of registration, there never-
theless exists some degree of flexibility as to which type of registration
is to be used.
Intrastate offerings have certain advantages. They involve few
delays in bringing an issue to market. 15 8 They allow the use of financial
projections, photographs, and renderings in presenting the issue to the
public.' 59 The offering circular may be xeroxed, mimeographed or
printed on long, short or colored paper.'6 0 The securities may be sold
153. Compare CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 10251(a), 10260(e) with § 10271.
154. See CAL. CoRp. CODE § 25100(e).
155. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1964). For detailed discussions of the require-
ments of the intrastate exemption, see 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 591-605
(1961); 4 L. Loss, SEcuRrriEs REGULATiON 2600-06 (1961, Supp. 1969); SEC Release
No. 4434 (Dec. 13, 1961); McCauley, Intrastate Securities Transactions Under the
Federal Securities Act, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 937 (1939); Sosin, The Intrastate Exemp-
tion: Public Offerings and the Issue Concept, 16 W. REs. L. REV. 110 (1964).
156. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bb (1964).
157. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25111.
158. With reasonable luck an issue can be prepared and qualified in California
in 4 to 6 weeks, while it may take 3 to 4 months to get it through the SEC, absent
cursory review.
159. Inasmuch as the SEC quarrels over projections and photographs as being
nonrepresentative, they are seldom used. In recent California intrastate offerings,
however, some extremely imaginative presentations have been made. E.g., Offering
Circular for Country Club Apartments (June 26, 1970) (drawings); Offering Cir-
cular for One Wilshire Co. (July 13, 1970) (projections); Offering Circular for West-
wood Investment Company (May 11, 1970) (photographs and financial projections).
It is rumored that certain partnerships registered with the SEC have circulated
projections to California residents along with the prospectus after it had become
effective. These projections have been approved by California's Commissioner of
Corporations under CAL. AD. CODE fit. 10, § 260.302 (1968).
160. The Offering Circular for Westwood Investment Company (May 11, 1970)
had a cover printed in burnt orange; the all time extreme, however, was achieved by
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through real estate seminars or may be marketed on television. 6'
Among the disadvantages of using the intrastate exemption to
make a public offering, at least in California, is the lack of a provision
for a preliminary offering circular or "red herring"-presale of the issue
using letters of interest is thereby prevented.' 62  Technical require-
ments of the SEC further complicate the use of the exemption. For
example, the partnership must be conducting substantial operational
activities in the state of incorporation." 3  This does not mean that the
partnership cannot have activities in two or more states nor does it
mean that a portion of the proceeds cannot be used in a second state.
The question of what portion of the proceeds could be so used has never
been tested; however, if the partnership employed 75 percent of the
proceeds in its home state, it would seem to have utilized a substantial
portion there."'
The greatest problem with an intrastate offering is insuring that it
is sold only to residents of one state."' If the inadvertent sale of even
one share, unit, or participation interest is made, the exemption is lost
for the entire offering. In those offerings limited to persons evidencing
a substantial net worth and making a minimum purchase of $3,000 to
$5,000, the margin of profit for each sale allows verification of the
purchaser's residence.
TeleMart Enterprises, Inc. Each page of the offering circular was printed on
brilliant yellow stock, and a magenta and orange logo was printed on the right hand
corner of the cover page. Offering Circular of TeleMart Enterprises, Inc. (Apr. 8,
1970).
161. CAL. AD. CODE tit. 10, § 260.302 (1968), permits advertising which has
been preapproved by the Commissioner of Corporations; SEC Release No. 4434
(Dec. 13, 1961) makes it clear that the SEC will permit an advertisement going to
residents of two or more states so long as sales will be made only to residents of a
single state. TeleMart Enterprises, Inc. raised over a million dollars by offers made
exclusively on television. For a humorous article by TeleMart's counsel describing
the offering, see Augustine & Hrusoff, The Screaming Yellow Prospectus, DIcTA, Sept.
1970, at 10 (San Diego B. Ass'n pub.).
162. If a limited partnership is registered with the SEC, the "red herring" may be
circulated throughout California before the issue is qualified. In fact, the California
Commissioner of Corporations may be responsible for many of the changes made in
the final prospectus. There is no logical reason why the same procedure could not
be followed with an intrastate offering, thereby enabling the underwriter to obtain some
indication of the market's response to the issue before signing the underwriting agree-
ment. By allowing this procedure, there would be fewer "best efforts" intrastate offer-
ings and more "firm" underwritings.
163. SEC Release No. 4434 (Dec. 13, 1961).
164. See SEC v. Truckee Showboat, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 824 (S.D. Cal. 1957);
SEC Release No. 4434 (Dec. 13, 1961).
165. See SEC v. Hillsborough Inv. Corp., 173 F. Supp. 86, 88 (D.N.H. 1958).
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A further problem may arise with overzealous securities salesmen.
There have been instances where the salesman, rather than lose an
order, has purchased the security in the name of a nominee and shortly
thereafter transferred it to a nonresident owner. 166 This causes the
whole issue to lose the intrastate exemption. Once securities come to
rest in the hands of permanent investors, however, there are no hazards
in making transfers to nonresidents. 167  Since determining when the se-
curities have come to rest is subjective, and differs with each individual
investor, many issuers insist that investors refrain from transferring
their interests for a year after the offering closes. There is some au-
thority that the SEC will abide by a 1 year holding period.6 8 Shorter
transfers in special circumstances-for example, where the distribution
involves no securities salesmen-have been used in the past.1
69
In the event the partnership is offered nationally, Blue Sky Law
problems may be encountered in three general areas: investment poli-
cies, management and promotional fees, and transferability of partner-
ship interests.
A. Partnership Investments
Historically, limited partnerships formed for the purchase of real
estate have purchased a single parcel which is described in the prospectus
or offering circular in detail.'1 0  Blue Sky Commissioners have come
to expect this type of presentation. Burnham Properties, a public
limited partnership offering, broke from tradition and announced that
it would invest in an undescribed portfolio of real estate',1
71
In California neither the Corporations Code nor the regulations
prohibits undefined real estate investments; however, such offerings are
not looked upon with favor. Marsh and Volk point out that
[t]he Commissioner normally will not authorize the offer and
166. E.g., Armstrong, Jones & Co. v. SEC, 421 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1970); Stadia
Oil & Uranium Co. v. Wheelis, 251 F.2d 269 (10th Cir. 1957); Brooklyn Manhattan
Transit Corp., 1 S.E.C. 147 (1935).
167. SEC Release No. 4434 (Dec. 13, 1961).
168. Brooklyn Manhattan Transit Corp., 1 S.E.C. 147 (1935).
169. Offering Circular for TeleMart Enterprises, Inc., at 14 (Apr. 8, 1970) (re-
striction period 3 months; issue marketed without aid of underwriters).
170. See, e.g., Offering for One Wilshire Co. (July 13, 1970); Prospectus for Jas-
min Groves Co., at 3 (Nov. 20, 1968).
171. Prospectus for Burnham Properties Ltd., at 2-3 (Nov. 12, 1969). For other
examples, see Prospectus for M.D.D.S. Realty Co., at 4-5 (Sept. 15, 1969); Prospectus
for MultiVest Real Estate, Inc., at 7 (June 23, 1970); cf. Preliminary Prospectus of
CLFS Associates, at 5 (Aug. 28, 1970) (some property is owned with plans to buy
more in the future).
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sale of limited partnership interests in a "blind pool" where there
is no specific property proposed to be acquired by the real estate
syndicate and the formation of the syndicate is solely for the pur-
pose of raising funds to acquire unspecified property at some time
in the future.1 72
New York prohibits such offerings by statute. 1 7  As many offerings
have some percentage of the proceeds uncommitted, it is the authors'
understanding that the Bureau of Ccndominium, Theatre and Syndica-
tion Financing in the New York Attorney General's Office (the agency
responsible for administering the statute) has implemented the statute
by unofficially requiring that two-thirds of the offering be committed
to identified properties. Real estate investment trusts meet this re-
quirement by purchasing construction loan participations from com-
mercial banks-frequently at lower yields than would be available if
the trusts were able to invest the proceeds of the offering in new
loans.
1 74
Theoretically, there should be no greater objection to a limited
partnership investing in a portfolio of undisclosed real estate than there
would be to a new mutual fund investing in an undisclosed securities
portfolio, or to a real estate investment trust investing in an unknown
portfolio of real estate mortgages or equities. 1 75  For this reason, Burn-
ham Properties adopted the approach used by real estate investment
trusts. It contracted to purchase participations in bank construction
loans maturing over a 10-month period with $14,000,000 of the $20,-
000,000 proceeds 176 of its offering. The California Commissioner of
Corporations found this procedure acceptable; however, the New York
Attorney General did not, and for this reason, partnership interests
were not offered in New York.
B. Management and Promotional Fees
The second problem is that of insider fees. The California Corpo-
rations Commissioner and several of the Blue Sky Commissioners are
concerned that the total amount of compensation paid to promoters be
172. H. MARSH & R. VOLK, PRACTICE UNDER THE CALIFORNIA CORPORATE SE-
CURITIES LAW OF 1968, at 318 (1969) [hereinafter cited as MARSH & VOLK].
173. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-e (McKinney 1968), as amended (Supp. 1969).
174. Thomas, Misplaced Trusts?, Barron's, July 7, 1969, at 3, col. 3.
175. The one valid distinction could be the lack of liquidity of the investment.
In the event a shareholder of either a mutual fund or a real estate investment trust
becomes dissatisfied with the manager's selection of investments, he can immediately
sell his interest. Until recently, this alternative was not open to a limited partner.
See text accompanying notes 194-204 infra.
176. Prospectus for Burnham Properties Ltd., at 4-5 (Nov. 12, 1969).
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reasonable. 177  The problem is especially nebulous because only the
most rudimentary guidelines exist. Although there are a good many
variations, fees to "insiders" may generally be divided into three clas-
sifications: advisory fees; indirect benefits, such as real estate brokerage
fees, insurance commissions, and property management fees; and actual
promotional interests.
In a large partnership, as in a real estate investment trust, the
general partner or advisor, if one is used, is entitled to a fee for seeking
out and managing the investments. In Burnham Properties the fee
was 1/2 of 1 percent of gross assets plus an incentive of an additional
1/8 of 1 percent to 3/8 of 1 percent of gross assets, depending on the
amount of the return on capital.178  One or two Blue Sky Commis-
sioners have suggested that there is no reason why the means of
computing the fee should not be the same as that used by the bulk
of the real estate investment trusts. Such a fee might amount to
1/10 of 1 percent of the average book value of the invested assets per
month and, as an incentive, an amount equal to 10 percent of the net
capital gains plus 10 percent of the amount by which net profits exceed
8 percent per annum of the net worth of the partnership. 79 But in
no event should the fee exceed the greater of: 1.5 percent of the
average net assets of the partnership, net assets being defined as total
invested assets at cost less total liabilities excluding depreciation re-
serves; or 25 percent of the net income of the partnership, excluding
provision for depreciation and realized capital gains and losses and ex-
traordinary items, and before deducting advisory and servicing fees and
expenses-but in no event shall this amount exceed 1.5 percent of the
total invested assets of the partnership. 80 At one time two schedules,
one for equity trusts and one for mortgage trusts, were proposed. This
gave rise to the inference that partnerships might adopt the equity
schedule."8' In explaining the new statement of policy, however,
Thomas Nelson, Chairman of the Policy Committee, made it clear that
the new rules not only were not binding on partnerships but that the
Midwest Commissioners had no policy regarding partnerships. 82
177. CAL. AD. CODE tit 10, § 260.140.111(a) (1968).
178. Prospectus for Burnham Properties, Ltd., Annex A, at 2-4 (Nov. 12, 1969).
179. E.g., Prospectus for Wells Fargo Mortgage Investors, at 17 (June 30, 1970);
cf. Prospectus of Connecticut General Mortgage and Realty Investments, at 17 (Mar.
17, 1970).
180. Midwest Commissioners' Policy C, supra note 75.
181. The Midwest Securities Commissioners Ass'n, Proposed Statement of Policy
on Real Estate Investment Trusts 1 C(1) (Feb. 20, 1970).
182. Address by Thomas Nelson, 53rd Annual Conference North American Se-
curities Administrators, Sept. 21, 1970.
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In many partnerships, the general partner is given a promotional
interest. This interest may be as high as 25 percent if no selling com-
mission is granted, or 10 percent if there are selling expenses.'" 3 In the
event the promoters receive such an interest, California Corporation
Code section 15523 requires that the limited partners shall have their
entire capital contribution returned before the general partners realize
anything from their promotional interest. The regulations carry this
rule one step further by providing:
A subordinated interest should provide that a six percent per an-
num cumulative payment from net profit (calculated without any
regard to accelerated depreciation) on invested capital must be
made to the limited partners before any additional distribution of
such net profit is made to both limited and general partners in ac-
cordance with the profit-sharing formula of the agreement.184
There is no further statutory support for this regulation.
The regulation would be difficult to apply, however, if a portion of
the capital gains were to be distributed over a series of years without
being characterized as a return of capital. As a consequence, it seems
to have been ignored on occasion.18 5  The requirement would be rea-
sonable if the limited partners and the general partner (who has not
contributed cash) shared in partnership income. However, in those
situations where the limited partners receive all income and the general
partner receives a minimal advisory fee plus a share in the capital gain,
there is no rational basis for the requirement.' 86
As the agreement may properly allocate depreciation dispropor-
tionately among partners, 8 7 Investment Properties Associates granted
50 percent of the depreciation to the promoters (general partner and
special limited partner) who had contributed approximately 25.5 per-
cent of the capital, thereby substantially increasing the benefit received
by them from the partnership.188
183. CAL. AD. CODE tit. 10, § 260.140.111(b) (1968).
184. Id. See Offering Circular for Pauma Valley Properties, Ltd., at 7 (Aug. 11,
1970), for an example of the regulation without modification.
185. Coordinated Growth Properties allowed the promoters 5 percent of the
profits and losses without regard to the 6 percent test. Offering Circular for Coordi-
nated Growth Properties, at 12 (July 8, 1969).
186. Jasmin Groves adopted a modified version of the Commissioner's formula.
The limited partners will receive a cash payment equal to 15 percent on their invest-
ment before the general partner receives anything; however, once the 15 percent is
paid, the general partner receives a payment up to 20 percent of the operating income
with any excess going to the limited partners. The general partner also receives 20
percent of all capital gain from the sale of real estate. Prospectus for Jasmin Groves,
at 15 (Nov. 20, 1968).
187. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 704(a).
188. Prospectus for Investment Properties Associates, at 7, 31 (Dec. 4, 1969).
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The "promoters may also receive management fees for actual serv-
ices .. . ."'I" Many promoters will manage the property and charge
the partnership an appropriate fee. Typically, the manager is paid a
percentage of gross rentals or a percentage of invested gross assets.
Five percent is a normal fee.'9 0 In addition, the promoter will receive
commissions for insuring the partnership property.
In some cases promoters have received substantial fees for these
services. In an attempt to control real or imagined abuses in real
estate investment trusts, the Midwest Commissioners are requiring that
a majority of the trustees be independent of the manager and a majority
of the trustees approve all contracts with the manager. 9' It would be
unreasonable to assume that similar restrictions will not be placed on
partnerships.
If the promoter is in the real estate business, and he almost always
is, he will desire to receive real estate commissions for property he
sells to the partnership or property owned by the partnership which is
listed for sale. There is no reason why the promoter should not be
allowed to earn listing fees once a decision has been made to sell a
given parcel of partnership property, for the property will be listed with
multiple brokers and in all likelihood will not be sold by the promoter.
Frequently, a real estate broker, to make a sale, will form a lim-
ited partnership in order to purchase the property. If the terms of the
transaction are fully disclosed, the SEC has no choice but to allow the
offering. In California, where such offerings are common, the com-
mission must be reasonable for the offering to be qualified.
192
Certain promoters have carried this concept to extreme. Marsh
and Volk point out:
Transactions have come to the attention of the Department of Cor-
porations wherein the promoter has entered into an escrow to
acquire property for a purchase price, for example, of $500,000,
and makes a $25,000 deposit in escrow. The promoter then
forms the real estate syndicate to acquire the property for $750,000
and opens a second escrow through which the syndicate will acquire
the property from the promoter. Through the device of "back-
189. CAL. AD. CODE tit. 10, § 260.140.111(d) (1968).
190. Prospectus for M.D.D.S. Realty Co., at 7 (Sept. 15, 1969). In 97-Woodruff
Apartments, the manager was allowed a 4 percent fee. Offering Circular of 97-
Woodruff Apartments Co., at 7 (July 16, 1969).
191. Midwest Commissioners' Policy 1 B, supra note 75. The general partner has
always had a problem in that he and the manager are identical in interest. This
problem can be solved if the general partner is a corporation, a majority of whose
directors are independent of the advisor, which in turn is a separate entity.
192. See CAL. AD. CODE tit. 10, § 260.140.111(d) (1968).
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to-back escrows", the promoter receives $250,000 cash profit
in connection with the transaction. The Department of Corpora-
tions will, with rare exception, view such a transaction as unfair,
unjust, and inequitable to the purchasers who had limited partner-
ship interests in the subsequent syndication. 193
C. Transferability of Partnership Shares
The third and most difficult problem is the "so-called" California
legend-the requirement that each partnership agreement or partner-
ship certificate contain a legend or statement printed on it that the
security may not be transferred to a new purchaser without the ac-
quiescence of the Commissioner."' Although the rules do not say so,
the restriction only applies if the purchaser resides in California. In
many instances the Commissioner will readily consent to the transfer
upon joint application by the seller and prospective purchaser. Even
in the best situations, however, free transferability is hampered. It
goes without saying that a non-legended security is more marketable
than a legended issue, especially if the stock is to be sold to nonresident
investors who are totally unfamiliar with legended securities.
The Commissioner's regulations specifically provide that "a legend
condition . . . will normally be imposed on the limited partnership in-
terests."19  No reason is given for singling out limited partnerships
for restrictive treatment, although Marsh and Volk suggest that the
legend is imposed because of the "inherent non-liquid nature of limited
partnership interests."" In the typical limited partnership, the re-
striction may also be justified because of the lack of diversification
among the type or location of the partnership investments or because
the limited partner may be assessed to meet mortgage payments. An-
other reason could be to alert the investor that he is buying into a highly
speculative venture. This would be true if the partnership is formed
for oil and gas exploration, the management is new and untried, or the
promoters are unknown.
1 9 7
193. MARSH & VOLK 315-16.
194. CAL. AD. CODE tit. 10, § 260.141.10 (1968) provides that the Commissioner
of Corporations may impose a legend whenever "securities are issued pursuant to a
limited offering qualification and (a) a variation from the standards normally im-
posed in an open qualification is approved by the Commissioner based upon the char-
acteristics of the particular purchasers or their close relationship with the issuer and the
Commissioner determines that there is a substantial danger that subsequent transfers
of such securities might be unfair, unjust or inequitable to the subsequent purchasers
thereof ......
195. CAL. AD. CODE tit. 10, § 260.140.113 (1968).
196. MARSH & VOLK 317.
197. It can also be argued that limited partners do not have the right to elect an
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In a situation where partnership interests in large scale diversified
real estate partnerships are offered by an underwriter heading a syn-
dicate, several of the reasons for imposing a legend condition evapo-
rate. At the outset, a registration will have been filed with the SEC, 9 '
and the partnership will be subject to the reporting requirements im-
posed under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.19' The re-
quirement that a partnership submit itself to initial investigation by the
SEC as well as to subsequent annual reporting does not insure that it
is a worthwhile investment; however, this additional scrutiny does pro-
duce a better quality offering.
If partnership interests are offered in $5,000 or $10,000 units, the
secondary market may be somewhat thin. Nevertheless, the market for
$20,000,000 of limited partnership interests is probably considerably
broader than the market for a $500,000 corporate equity issue which
is not subject to a legend condition. Although the underwriter (for
tax or other reasons), may not desire or be able to make a market in
the traditional sense, it will be in a position to execute trades on a
matching of buy and sell orders.200 In those instances where assign-
ments of participation interests in the limited partner's holding are of-
fered in minimum units of $10, $15, or $20, and the underwriter stands
ready to make a public market in these interests, there is no logical rea-
son why a legend should be imposed.21
The Commissioner has relaxed his standards in two recent offer-
ings. In both Jasmin Groves and Burnham Properties, partnership in-
terests were offered without a legend, conditioned upon the initial offer-
ing being limited to a restricted class of purchasers and upon the repre-
sentation by the general partner that no one would be allowed to become
annual slate of officers. However, a majority in interest may have the power, according
to the partnership agreement, to remove the general partner, to amend the partnership
agreement, to dissolve the partnership, and to block the sale or pledge of substantially
all the partnership assets. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 15507. As such, their voting rights
are almost as meaningful as those possessed by the shareholders of a public corporation.
198. Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1964).
199. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-hh (1964), as amended (Supp. V, 1970).
200. Traditionally, the market maker maintains a position in the security and
will buy any amount offered for sale, even in the absence of corresponding buy orders.
201. See, e.g., Prospectus for Investment Properties Associates (Dec. 4, 1969). It
is submitted that under basic contract principles allowing free assignment of the benefits
of a contract, the general partner would be hard pressed to refuse payment of pro-
rata earnings to an assignee failing to meet the minimum standards regardless of
the representations made to the Corporations Commissioner. Nevertheless, there is
no question but that the assignee could be denied the right to become a substituted
limited partner.
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a substituted limited partner unless he met the standards imposed upon
the initial purchaser. In Jasmin, the investor was required to have
net assets of $200,000 or to be in the 50 percent tax bracket;20 2 in
Burnham the investor was merely required to have net assets of
$50,000.203
With the enactment of the Real Estate Syndicate Act, the legisla-
ture (with the support of the Corporations Commissioner) transferred
jurisdiction over certain limited partnerships investing solely in real
estate to the Real Estate Commissioner. 20 4  Those owned beneficially
by more than 100 persons, 20 5 and those for which a registration state-
ment had been filed under the Securities Act of 1933206 remain under
the jurisdiction of the Corporations Commissioner.07 As this will re-
move all of the small, non-underwritten limited partnerships from the
jurisdiction of the Corporations Commissioner, it is submitted that those
partnerships registered with the SEC should be treated in the same
manner as corporate stock issues. This is especially so if the under-
writer can guarantee that a dissatisfied investor has a market in which
he can dispose of his partnership interest.
Conclusion
Despite the inconveniences of the organizational form, tax prob-
lems, and difficulties with Blue Sky Commissioners, the number of
public limited partnerships are increasing. In many respects they are
still in a state of flux. On the one hand, there exist such ventures as
Westwood Investment Company, a $400,000 intrastate offering for the
purchase of a single apartment complex. On the other hand are
offerings such as Jasmin Groves, Burnham Properties and Investment
Properties.
Today, partnerships are fumbling with two basic problems-di-
versity and liquidity of investment. As a greater number of large
issues come to market, each containing a series of properties, the aver-
sion to a large non-described portfolio will vanish as it did with mutual
funds. The problem of liquidity is somewhat more difficult to solve.
One group of promoters is attempting to create liquidity by pro-
202. Prospectus for Jasmin Grove Co., at 6 (Dec. 3, 1968).
203. Prospectus for Burnham Properties Ltd., Annex B, at 1 (Nov. 12, 1969).
204. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10270.
205. Id. § 10251(a).
206. Id. § 10260(e).
207. Id. § 10270.
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viding some form of redemption. One Wilshire Company20° and Pa-
cific Area Real Estate Fund, Ltd. 9 will attempt to redeem those units
offered them. Efforts in this direction encounter two stumbling blocks.
First, the partnership must constantly value its holdings, a problem not
dissimilar to a mutual fund valuing its portfolio of "lettered" stock for
purposes of establishing redemption values. And second, the partner-
ship could face a severe task in maintaining sufficiently liquid funds
to redeem those units offered it. Further, if units are to be continuously
redeemed, the partnership must continue to sell units or it will soon
pay out all its capital by way of redemptions. A continuous influx of
capital may be equally troublesome as it will create difficulties in port-
folio management.
The second group is attempting to establish a market for limited
partnership units. The trading of $5,000 or $10,000 units, although
difficult, is not impossible. In fact, most debentures trade in $5,000
units. The more workable solution, however, is to have one limited
partner who has purchased the entire offering sell assignments of por-
tions of his interest. These assignments need not be recorded every
time a transfer is made and they can be traded in units as low as $10.
It can reasonably be expected that once solutions are found to the
two remaining problems, limited partnerships will become as common
as real estate investment trusts. Five years from now it would not be
surprising to see Wells Fargo or the Bank of America bring out a $100,-
000,000 limited partnership for investment in an unspecified portfolio
of real estate.
208. Offering Circular of One Wilshire Co., at 4 (1970).
209. Preliminary Prospectus for Pacific Area Real Estate Fund Ltd., at 13-15
(Mar. 23, 1970).
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